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Double Jeopardy: Contempt CitationjDoes
Not Bar Later Conviction for Substantive Crime
While testifying in his own defense on a federal narcotics
charge, appellant stood up and threw the witness chair on which
he had been sitting at an Assistant United States Attorney. He
was held to be in contempt of court and was summarily sen-
tenced to imprisonment for one year.- When appellant was later
1. The chair was thrown some 15 feet and struck the jury rail about three
feet from the lectern where the Assistant United States Attorney was stand-
ing. This incident was one of many that occurred during a retrial upon an
indictment charging defendant and 28 others with violations of the Narcotic
Drugs Import and Export Act, 35 Stat. 614 (1909), 21 U.S.C. f§ 173, 174
(1958). The first trial ended in a mistrial when the foreman of the jury sus-
tained injuries on the eve of summation, at which time no alternate jurors
remained. At the conclusion of the first trial and prior to the declaration of
a mistrial, defendant was summarily held in contempt of court and sen-
tenced to 20 days in jail for refusing upon repeated warnings to stop talking
to -the judge and sit down. United States v. Galante, 298 Fad 72 (2d Cir.
1962). For an insight into the incredible and bizarre behavior of the defend-
ants, see Brief for Appellees, United States v. Bentvena, 308 F-ad 47 (2d Cir.
1962). See also United States v. Bentvena, 304 F.d 883 (2d Cir. 1962);
United States v. DiPietro, 302 Fa2d 612 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v.
Galante, supra; United States v. Bentvena, 288 Fad 442 (2d Cir. 1961). Some of
the more egregious incidents were the storming of the jury box by the de-
fendant, Panico; Panico's faked hanging attempt and his attempt to slash
his wrists in jail; the constant outbursts by the defendants in the presence
of the court. United States v. Panico, 308 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962), -vacated,
375 U.S. 29 (1963); United States v. Bentvena, 308 Fad 47 (2d Cir. 1902).
2. Fm. R. CRnm. P. 42(a) provides:
Summary Disposition: A criminal contempt may be punished sum-
marily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct consti-
tuting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence
of -the court. The order of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be
signed -by the judge and entered of record.
Punishment is considered discretionary under this rule. Maclnnis v. United
States, 191 F.2d 157, 162 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 953 (1952);
see United States v. Bollenbach, 125 F.2d 458 (2d Cir. 1942); United States
v. Landes, 97 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1938). Where sentencing has been severe,
however, the appellate courts -have been inclined to remand. See Yates v.
United States, 355 U.S. 66, 75-76 (1957); Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S.
385, 396 .(1957). In United States v. Barnett, 32 U.I,. Wz= 4303 (Apr. 7,
1964) the ACourt expressed the opinion that "some members of the Court are
of the view that, without regard to the seriousness of the offense, punishment
by summary trial without a jury would be constitutionally limited to that
penalty provided for petty offenses." Id. at 4307.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
indicted for assaulting a federal officer as a result of the chair-
throwing incident,' he moved to dismiss the indictment on the
ground that it was based on the same facts and proof as the con-
tempt citation and thus violated the fifth amendment's guarantee
against double jeopardy. The court denied the motion and held
that the double jeopardy clause does not prevent punishment
both by summary contempt and by indictment where a con-
tumacious act contains the elements of a substantive crime.
United States v. Mirra, 220 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
The double jeopardy clause - which protects a person from
being "twice put in jeopardy of life or limb" for the same offense
- has not achieved the stature of other clauses of the Bill of
Rights.' It is not one of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, for
example, that has been made wholly binding on the states through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment." And in fed-
eral prosecutions, the right of protection against double jeopardy
has been narrowly confined. The federal courts, in determining
if a second prosecution or a multiple-count indictment violates
the clause, have tended to look at whether the "same evidence" is
required to prove the charge in both indictments or the several
counts in a single indictment. If one extra or one different fact
is necessary to the proof of the offense charged in the second
count or indictment, the successive prosecution or multiple-count
indictment has been held outside the purview of the clause, on
3. Appellant was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1958), which provides:
Assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain oficers or employees: Who-
ever forcibly assaults . . . or interferes with any -person designated
in section 1114 of this title while engaged in or on account of the per-
formance of his official duties, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
Whoever, in the commission of any such acts uses a deadly or
dangerous weapon, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than ten years or both.
4. " . . . nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. See generally Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Suc-
cessive Prosecutions, 74 HARv. L. Rav. 1 (1960); Note, 65 YMAL L.J. 339 (1956).
6. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (5 to 4 decision). In addition, a
single criminal act may 'be the subject of successive prosecutions by both a
state and the federal government. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187
(1959); Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943); United States v. Lanza,
260 U.S. 377 (1922). The rationale underlying this principle is that the double
jeopardy clause is a guarantee only as against successive federal prosecution;
that an act made a crime by -both national and state sovereignties is an
offense against both and may 'be punished by both. This result is said to be
compelled by our concept of federalism. Abbate v. United States, supra at
195; see WEsTIN, AN AUTOBIOGRAPH'Y OF THE SUPREM COURT 354--55 (1903).
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the ground that the second trial or punishment is for a different
offense.7
The "same evidence" test has been most often applied where
a single act constitutes a violation of two or more statutes or
sections of a single statute.8 Where, under the test, different facts
are requisite to the proof of a second offense, multiple-count in-
dictments and consecutive punishments in a single trial have been
held not to violate the double jeopardy clause9 conviction or
acquittal for the death or injuries of one has not barred a second
prosecution and punishment for the death or injuries of another,
where a single criminal act caused multiple injuries or deaths;0
and a conviction for one violation has not been a bar to subse-
quent trial and punishment for a second violation of another sec-
tion of the same statute or another statute, both violations being
based on a single act.'
But the result has evoked much criticism. See Abbate v. United States,
=upra at 201 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); Grant, The Lanza Rule of Suc-
cessive Prosecutions, 32 Corm. L. Rnv. 1309 (1932); Grant, Successive Prose-
cutions by State and Nation: Common Law and Britizh Empire Comparisons,
4. U.C.L.A.T. Rnv. 1 (1956); Note, 55 CoLm. L. Ruv. 83 (1955). For a some-
what different and cogent argument, see Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sov-
ereignties and the Intruding Constitution, 28 U. Cnr. L. Thv. 591 (1961).
All but five of the states have double jeopardy provisions in their consti-
tutions. See ALI, ADMInSTRATION OF CRMINAL LAw: Dounrx JEoPAww
56-58 (1935).
7. See, e.g., Young v. United States, 288 Fad 398 (D.C. Cir. 1901), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 919 (1963); McGann v. United States, 261 F.2d 956 (4th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 US. 974 (1959); Duke v. United States, 255 F2d
721 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 920 (1958); Montgomery v. United States,
146 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1945).
The "same evidence" test is also used by most state courts. See Note, 7
BRooKLYN L,. REv. 79, 81 n26 (1937). A few states, however, utilize a "same
transaction" test. The question asked is whether both violations are part of
the same criminal transaction. If they are, to try the accused for both would
be to put -him twice in jeopardy for the same offense. See, e.g., Roberts v. State,
14 Ga. 8 (1853); State v. Mowser, 92 NT.L. 474, 106 At. 416 (1919); State v.
Cooper, 13 NJ.JL. 361 (1833); cf., State v. Shedrick, 69 Va. 428,38 At. 75 (1897);
33 HAnv. L. REv. 110 (1919). But see 68 U. PA. L. REv. 70 (1919).
8. See, e.g., Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958); Bell v. United
States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955); Albrecht v. United States, 273 US. 1 (1927).
9. Gore v. United States, 357 US. 386 (1958); Blockburger v. United
States, 2 U.S. 299 (1932); United States v. Jones, 248 F-ad 772 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 356 US. 923 (1957); United States v. Johnson, 235 F-ad 159 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 852 U.S. 1006 (1956). But see Ballerini v. Aderholt, 44 F.2d
352 (5th Cir. 1930). See also Gore v. United States, supra at 393 (Warren, C.3.,
dissenting).
10. Cf. Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958); Hoag v. New Jersey, 350
U.S. 464 (1958).
11. McGann v. United States, 261 F.2d 956 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 US. 974 (1959); Nemec v. United States, 191 Fa2d 810 (9th Cir. 1951);
1964]
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Several recent Supreme Court decisions, however, indicate that
the "same evidence" test may no longer be acceptable in all fed-
eral prosecutions. In Abbate v. United States,12 Mr. Justice Bren-
nan emphasized in a separate opinion that the Supreme Court
has never recognized the "same evidence" test in successive prose-
cutions.3 The recent case of United States v. Maraker,'14 where
the Supreme Court reversed without opinion appellant's convic-
tion for illegally bringing narcotics into the country, after he had
been acquitted when prosecuted for conspiracy, appears to sub-
stantiate Mr. Justice Brennan's views."' The government already
seems to have accepted this position, for in United States v.
Petite6 it moved for an order to vacate a second conviction, ob-
tained on substantially the same facts as the first, on the ground
that it was against government policy to have successive prose-
cutions.17
The Supreme Court's recent approach, that at least in federal
cases the prosecution is barred from subsequently prosecuting
another act out of the same transaction once the first prosecution
has been taken to a verdict," will not work an unreasonable hard-
ship on federal prosecutors. That an accused may be tried a sec-
ond time for the same offense where he has obtained the reversal
Lewis v. United States, 6 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1925); Coy v. United States, 5
F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1925); Bell v. United States, 2 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1024);
United States v. Mandile, 119 F. Supp. 266 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
12. 859 U.S. 187 (1959).
13. Id. at 198 n.2 (1959) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
14. 370 U.S. 723 (1962).
15. The Court did not write an opinion. Mr. Justices Black, Douglas, and
Brennan, however, stated that their reason for reversing was that the second
trial was a violation of the double jeopardy clause; they cited Mr. Justice
Brennan's separate opinion in Abbate as authority. Cf. United States v.
Crosby, 314 F.2d 654, 657 (1963). It appears that at least successive prosecu-
tions under the "same evidence" test will, in the future, be found violative
of the double jeopardy clause.
16. 861 U.S. 529 (1960).
17. The government said that its general policy was that where several
offenses arise out of a single transaction they should be alleged and tried to-
gether and should not be made the basis of multiple prosecutions: "a policy
dictated by considerations both of fairness to defendants and of efficient and
orderly law enforcement." Id. at 530.
18. The adoption of a more liberal federal double jeopardy standard may
eventually require the states to adhere to a similar standard. Although the
double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment has not heretofor been
incorporated into the fourteenth amendment, a changed standard at the fed-
eral level may influence the Court to take another look at what is required
by due process. See Ciucci v. Illinois, 856 U.S. 571 (1958); Hoag v. New
Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
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of a conviction by his own appeal is already well established. 10
Also, even though jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when the
entire jury has been empaneled and sworn -0 and in a trial with-
out a jury after the first witness is sworn,2 1 jeopardy is not re-
garded as ended so as to bar a second trial for the same offense
in those cases where unforeseeable circumstances arise during the
first trial making its completion impossible; for example, the
failure of the jury to agree on a verdict.2
A most persuasive argument, however, for overruling the
"same evidence" test in all federal prosecutions is that where
the same act violates different federal statutes or sections of a
single statute protecting .eparate federal interests, those inter-
ests can be adequately protected in a single trial by the imposi-
tion of consecutive punishments for each violation; where the
federal interests are not separate, consecutive punishments and,
of course, multiple-count indictments are undesirableF By re-
quiring the federal government to litigate all its grievances against
an individual arising out of a single criminal act in one trial, the
Supreme Court would best carry out the underlying policies of
the double jeopardy clause. This frees an accused from the anxiety
and expense of defending against repeated prosecutions for a
single wrongful act as well as from the imposition of more than
the statutory maximum punishment for his offense.
Under the new standard federal judges will ask the following
question: Were both violations part of the same criminal transac-
tion? If they were, to try the accused for both would be to put
19. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). The new trial is generally
considered a second jeopardy, but most courts justify it on the ground that
appellant has "waived" his plea of former jeopardy by askdng that the con-
viction be set aside. See, e.g., Brewster v. Swope, 180 Fa2d 984 (9th Cir. 1950).
Some courts view the second trial as continuing the same jeopardy that had
attached at the first trial because that jeopardy does not come to an end
until the accused has been acquitted or his conviction has become final. See,
e.g., State v. Aus, 105 Mont. 82, 69 P.2d 584 (1937); of. Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
20. Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); Wade v. Hunter, 336
U.S. 684 (1949); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904); see 1 Wmzn-
Tox, CRnmTx L&* AwD Pnoc muan 08-09 (12th ed. 1957).
21. See Clawans v. Rives, 104 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1939); 1 Wn~Auo., op.
cit. supra note 20, at 309-10.
22. Wade v. Hunter, 836 U.S. 684 (1949). See also 38 ST. Joint's L. REv.
158 (1963).
23. See, e.g., Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958); Bell v. United
States, 349 US. 81, 82-83 (1955).
24. See, e.g., Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) (Warren, CJ.,
dissenting); i. at S95 (Douglas, J., dissenting); i. at S97 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). See also Note, 57 YAm LJ. 182 (1947).
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him twice in jeopardy for the same offense. The new test cannot
be rigidly applied, for in some situations the policies underlying
the double jeopardy clause must give way to successive prosecu-
tionsY5 Where an accused is convicted of a lesser crime and sub-
sequently, through no oversight of the prosecutor, it becomes
evident that he is guilty of a greater crime, for example, the first
conviction should not bar a subsequent trial for the greater crime,
even though it arose out of the same criminal transaction. Thus,
where an individual is convicted of an assault and battery and,
at a later date, the victim dies, the former conviction should not
bar a subsequent prosecution for the greater crime.20 On the other
hand, if the accused were acquitted of the assault and battery
charge he could not later be retried for murder, since the state
has already had an opportunity and failed to show an essential
element of the offense.
The court in the instant case correctly decided that a sum-
mary contempt citation 7 should not bar the subsequent prosecu-
25. In State v. Currie, 197 A.2d 678 (NJ. 1964), the New Jersey Supreme
Court flexibly applied the prohibition against double jeopardy, considering
the underlying policies of the clause rather than its technisms. The court
held that a municipal court conviction for reckless driving and leaving the
scene of an accident did not bar the subsequent prosecution for assault and
battery growing out of the same incident. The court emphasized the dis-
similar nature of the two offenses -the assault and battery charge requiring
criminal intent- and the dissimilar methods of disposing of them- the
driving charges before local police magistrates, usually without counsel, and
with relatively minor maximum fines and terms of imprisonment. In light
of these differences, the court found that a
refusal to permit the proceeding before the magistrate to bar subse-
quent criminal prosecution for the death or the serious injury caused
by the defendant is readily comprehensible. The elements of oppres-
sion or harassment historically aimed at by the constitutional and
common law prohibition are not significantly involved; and permitting
the second prosecution would not violate the reasonable expectations
attendait upon the first proceeding while barring it would operate with
gross unfairness to the State.
197 A.2d at 685. Compare State v. Mowser, 92 NJ.L. 474, 106 At. 416 (1919);
State v. Cooper, 13 NJ.L. 361 (1833).
26. See Hopkins v. United States, 4 App. D.C. 430 (1894).
27. FEi. R. Canvr. P. 42(a) provides that "criminal contempt may be
punished summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct
constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of
the court. . . ." But see Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1,14 (1952) (Black, J.,
dissenting); FonKoscu, CONSTIUTUMNAI, LAw § 112 (1968); Frankfurter &
Landis, Power to Regulate Contempts, 37 HAnv. L. REv. 1010 (1924); Gold-
farb, The Constitution and Contempt of Court, 61 MicH. L. REV. 283 (1962);
Goldfarb, The Varieties of the Contempt Power, 13 SmRAcusE L. RItv. 44
(1961); Nelles, The Summary Power To Punish for Contempt, 31 CoLuM. L.
REv. 956 (1931).
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tion of the contumacious act as a substantive crime. Although
only a single act had been committed, it constituted two separate
and unrelated offenses. One offense was against the dignity and
effectiveness of the court in its administration of the laws, and
the other was against the public peace guarded by the state
through criminal sanctions. 8 The first offense must be punished
when it occurs to enable a court to control the conduct of those
appearing before it 9
Unlike other offenses that arise from the "same transaction,"
where the public interest can be protected in one trial and by the
imposition of one penalty, the contumacious act must be pun-
ished immediately. Although the courts and the state undoubt-
edly have the same general interest in the punishment of anti-
social behavior, the courts have a further substantial and exclusive
interest to protect.2° In order to give speedy, orderly and just
treatment to those appearing before it, the court must be able to
command respect and control the actions of those persons. To
allow an individual to escape the consequences of his contuma-
cious act through the double jeopardy clause would be to coun-
tenance a state of affairs where judges could become ineffectual
in restoring judicial decorum for fear that a contempt conviction
would bar a subsequent prosecution for the same act.3
Clayton Act: Private Party Denied
Treble Damages for Violation of Section 7
Plaintiffs, shareholders of General Motors Corporation, brought
a derivative suit against E. I. duPont de Nemours & Company
seeking treble damages for injuries allegedly caused by duPont's
28. See O' lly v. United States, 128 F.2d 676 (8th Cir.), rcv'd on other
grounds, 317 US. 412 -(194-2), where the court held that a contempt convic-
tion was not a bar to a proceeding for conspiracy even though both proceed-
ings were based on the same act. Of. Long v. Commonwealth, 197 S.W. 843
(Kent. 1917); State v. Yancy, 4 N.C. 138, 1 L. Rep. 519 (1813). See also State
v. Woodiin, 27 N.C. 199 (1844) (contempt and perjury); Ricketts v. State,
111 Tenn. 380, 77 S.W. 1076 (1903) (contempt and perjury); 1 Bisnop, Cnur-
.L, LAw § 1067 (9th ed. 1923); 22 CJ.S. C-riminal Law § 293 (1961).
29. See Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957); Ez partc Terry, 128
U.S. 289 (1888).
30. But see Goldfarb, oupra note 27, 316-17.
31. The other alternative would be for the court summarily to hold the
prosecutor of the act in contempt and pronounce a sentence equalling that
which could be -had in a criminal prosecution. The defendant in such a pro-
ceeding might -be summarily sentenced to ten years without any of the pro-
cedural safeguards present in the usual criminal proceeding.
1964] 1001
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violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act' and section 7
of the Clayton Act.' Plaintiffs invoked section 5 of the Clayton
Act s for proof of the antitrust violations, relying on a prior gov-
ernment case4 in which duPont was found to have violated section
7 of the Clayton Act by acquiring and holding 23 percent of the
stock of General Motors Corporation. In a ruling given to define
the scope of pretrial discovery proceedings, a federal district
court ruled that a private treble damage action could not be
based on a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act. Gottesman
v. General Motors Corp., 221 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Congress, in designing the Clayton Act, provided in section 4
a supplement to governmental agency enforcement of the anti-
trust laws by giving to private parties injured by their violation
a right to sue for treble damages." Section 4 was intended to af-
1. Section 1 makes any trust or conspiracy in restraint of trade illegal.
Section 2 provides that monopolizing or attempting to monopolize trade is
a misdemeanor. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1058).
2.
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indi-
rectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital, and
no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Corn-
mission shall acquire the -whole or any part of the assets of another
corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce
in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
8.
A inal judgement or decree ... rendered in any civil . . . proceed-
ing brought by . . . the United States under the antitrust laws to the
effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie evi-
dence against such defendant in any action ... brought by any other
party ... under said laws... as to all matters respecting which
said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties
thereto.
88 Stat. 781 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1958).
4. United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
5. The court also held that the prior government judgment was not avail-
able to aid plaintiffs in proving their claims because it covered a period before
the date when they became shareholders of General Motors. Gottesman v.
General Motors Corp., 28 YF.hD. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
6. "That any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue ... and shall
recover threefold -the damages by him sustained ... 3." 88 Stat. 731 (1914),
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
A treble-damage recovery entails proof of three elements- an antitrust
violation, an injury to the plaintiff, and a causal relation 'between the viola-
tion and the injury. Radovich v. Natl Football League, 852 U.S. 445, 453
(1957); Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268, 274 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954); cf. Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 260 U.S.
1002 [Vol. 48
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ford injured parties a means of redress,7 deter infraction of the
antitrust laws by providing a heavy penalty for their violation.'
and insure their vigorous enforcement through private execution
as an adjunct to government enforcement
To further encourage actions by injured private parties, Con-
gress provided in section 5 of the Clayton Act that a final judg-
ment rendered in an antitrust suit brought by the United States
constitutes prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation in a
private treble damage suit.10 Since recovery in a private suit
depends on proof of an injury caused by a violation of the anti-
trust laws," the individual's burden of proof is considerably re-
duced where he can invoke a prior government judgment.
156, 165 (1922). See also Timberlake, Federal Antitrust Treble Damage Ac-
tions, 9 N.Y.LF. 145, 150 (1963).
7. Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 63d Cong., 2d
Sess., sex. 7, pt. 16, at 638 (1914) [hereinafter cited as 1914 Hearings]; see
Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-52 (1947); A' r
GEN. NAT'I. Comma. ATxTrmUST REP. 378 (1955). See generally Barber, Private
Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: The Robinson-Patman Experience, 30
GEO. WASH. L. Rsv. 181 (1961).
It has been suggested that one of the reasons for allowing threefold dam-
ages is to assure ample recovery where actual damages are too obscure or
difficult of proof or too speculative to be estimated. Hearings on H. R. 4597
Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 83d Cong.,
1st Sess. 9, 10 (1953) (bill to make recovery of treble damages discretionary
with the tria court).
8. 1914 Hearings pt. 16, at 647; see Maltz v. Sax, 184 F.2d 2, 5 (7th Cir.
1943). For examples of some large amounts awarded in treble damage actions,
see Note, 61 YAim LJ. 1010, 1063 (1952).
9. See Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751 (1947);
Hess v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 20 F.R.D. 466, 475 (S.D. Cal. 1957); ATT'Y
GEx. NATI'. Comm. AN'musT REP. 378 (1955); Timberlake, supra note 6, at
148. "[W]e have . ..begun to see the development of private litigation under
the triple-damage statute, which is of substantial help. It already is a de-
terrent." Hearings on H. R. 3408 Before the Subcommittee on the Study of
Monopoly Power of the House Committee on the udciary, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 1, pt. 3, at 15 (1951) (bill to allow the government -to sue for dam-
ages from antitrust violations); see Note, 61 YAm LJ. 1010, 1061, 1063 (1952).
10. See note 3 supra. The purpose of § 5 is to minimize the burdens of
litigation facing injured private suitors by "making available to them all
matters previously established by the Government in antitrust actions." Emich
Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 US. 558, 568 (1951); see H. HL
RP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1914); S. REP. No. 698, 6d Cong., 2d
Sess. 44 (1914). There seems to be no reason &or denying this advantage to
a private plaintiff -where the previous suit resulted in a finding of a § 7 viola-
tion.
11. Monticello Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 197 Fe2d 629 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 344 US. 875 (1952); Turner Glass Corp. v. Hartford-
Empire Co., 173 F.2d 49 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 830 (1949); Burn-
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The plaintiffs in the instant case sought to recover treble dam-
ages on the basis of a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act.
Section 7 proscribes corporate stock or asset acquisitions the
effect of which "may be substantially to lessen competition, or
tend to create a monopoly" in any line of commerce; 2 that sec-
tion was drafted to increase the efficacy of the antitrust laws by
arresting restraints or monopolies in their incipiency.' 8 Since an
actual restraint of trade need not be proved, the burden of prov-
ing a section 7 violation is less than that for proving other anti-
trust violations. For this reason the government has come in-
creasingly to rely on section 7 to prove antitrust violations.1 4 In
addition, in cases where the government alleges both a violation
of section 7 and the Sherman Act, courts generally will not even
look to see if the evidence proves a Sherman Act violation where
they can find that the defendant has violated section 7.15 Indeed,
ham Chem. Co. v. Borax Gonsol., 170 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 836 U.S. 924 (1949); see Timberlake, supra note 6, at 150; cf. Keogh
v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 165 (1922).
12. 64 Stat. 1125-26 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1963). The original Clayton
Act was amended in 1950 to proscribe asset as well as stock acquisitions,
thereby closing a loophole in the act.
13. "[Tjhe bill . . . seeks . . . to arrest the creation of trusts, conspira-
cies, and monopolies in their incipiency and before consummation." S. REP.
No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914). According to S. REP. No. 1775, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1950), the "reasonable probability" standard of § 7 em-
bodied in the words "may be" was written in by Congress "to arrest restraints
of trade in their incipiency and before they develop into full-fledged restraints
violative of the Sherman Act." See United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours
& Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957); Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors,
206 F.2d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 1953). See generally 1914 Hearings pts. 1-35.
The United States Supreme Court commented in Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 317-18 (1962):
[lit is apparent that a keystone in the erection of a barrier to what
Congress saw was the rising tide of economic concentration, was its
provision of authority for 'arresting mergers at a time when the trend
to a lessening of competition in a line of commerce was still in its in-
cipiency. Congress saw the process of concentration in American busi-
ness as a dynamic force; it sought to assure the Federal Trade Comi-
mission and the courts the -power -to brake this force at its outset and
before it gathered momentum.
14. Of 84 § 7 cases brought by the Department of Justice between 1914
and January 1, 1963, 68 were filed after January 1, 1955. In only 16 of these
cases were there also attempts to prove violations of other sections of the
antitrust laws. ABA SECTION OF ANTIRUST LAw, MERGER CAsE DIGEST (1903)
contains a compilation of cases. See Handler & Robinson, A Decade of Ad-
ministration of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, 61 CoLum. L. REV. 629
(1961); 64 CoLum. L. REV. 597, 599 (1964).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 323-
CASE COMMENTS
that is exactly what happened in the government suit relied on
by plaintiffs in the instant case.'0
By denying private parties the possibility of recovering treble
damages in a section 7 case,17 the court in the instant case, in
effect, required a greater burden of proof of an antitrust violation
for recovery by private parties than for the government to estab-
lish such a violation.' 8 By doing so, the instant court decreased
the availability of the private remedy. Treble-damage recovery
is therefore made more difficult by this decision because injured
parties must prove a Sherman Act violation - an actual restraint
of trade -and because they often will be unable to rely on a
prior government judgment; this difficulty may influence plain-
tiffs who are considering whether to institute a treble-damage
suit based on questionable antitrust activity.'9
The result reached by the court clearly seems inconsistent with
the purpose underlying section 4 of the Clayton Act;20 nor was
the result reached by the court compelled by the language of the
24 (1963); United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 US. 586,
588 n.5 (1957).
16. "Thus, a flnding of conspiracy to restrain -trade or attempt to monopo-
lize was excluded from the Court's decision." United States v. E. I. duPont
de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 340 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (re-
ferring to the Court's decision on the merits).
17. Although the court's holding is technically dicta, its "explicitness and
candor leave no doubt that its ruling was advertent." 64 CoLmr!. L. Plv. 597,
601 (1964).
No case has been found where a -private party successfully based a treble
damage action solely on a § 7 violation although allegations of violations of
§ 7 along with other of the antitrust laws -have been the basis for such suits.
See Kogan v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 20 F.R.D. 4 (D. Del. 1956); Ozdoba
v. Verney Brunswick Mills, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 136 (S.).N.Y. 1946).
Courts have upheld such complaints against motions to dismiss, however.
For example, in one case where a plaintiff based a treble damage suit solely
on an allegation of a § 7 violation, the court denied a motion to dismiss without
discussing the conceivability of proving injury to the plaintiff flowing from
the violation, declaring that "a complaint should not be dismissed unless it
appears to a certainty that plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any
state of facts which could be proved in support of -his claim . .. ." Foreign
Car Div., Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. 76688 (WI). Pa. 1960).
18. For a discussion of the burden facing a private litigant in an antitrust
case, see Loevinger, Private Action- TIze Strongest Pillar of Antjitrust, 3
A rusT BuLL. 167, 169 (1958).
19. The effectiveness of private action as an adjunct to government en-
forcement will be diminished if treble-damage actions are not to be allowed
for § 7 violations. However, private injunctive relief can still be obtained
under § 16 of the Clayton Act. 38 Stat. 737, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958).
20. See notes 7-9 supra and accompanying text.
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act. On the contrary, section 7 is expressly incorporated in the
antitrust laws,21 and it is the violation of the antitrust laws that
gives rise to a private cause of action under section 4. In addition,
the fact that section 5 does not except prior judgments of section
7 violations from constituting prima facie evidence of an antitrust
violation reinforces this conclusion. 22
The court, however, found that the plaintiffs could not be
injured by the potential restraints of trade proscribed by section
7. In the context of the instant case - a derivative suit by share-
holders in an acquired corporation -the decision may be justi-
fiable. Although derivative suits have played an increasingly
important antitrust role,3 their utility in section 7 cases is lim-
ited.24 The justification for derivative suits lies in the economic
benefit to the corporation.25 For example, a derivative suit seek-
ing an injunction against particular corporate activity that is
likely to produce multiple treble-damage claims would provide
such justification. But merger activity is unlikely to produce
demonstrable damage to potential plaintiffs because of the indefi-
niteness of the criteria necessary to prove a section 7 violation."2
In addition, a shareholder's proof of injury to the corporation
caused by the merger would be equally, if not more, difficult than
a private party's or the government's proof because of the share-
holder's relationship to the corporation. The merger would have
taken place at the instance of the company's management, and
presumably they acted to increase the economic benefit to the
corporation and to these shareholder plaintiffs. Furthermore, the
inherent difficulty of derivative suits would be compounded here
by the burden of proving economic detriment to the corporation
caused by the merger. Finally, the possibility of such suits in
combination with their expense to the corporation might encour-
age "strike suits."
21. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1958).
As originally drawn, section 4 would -have authorized treble-damage ac-
tions only for violations of §§ 1, 2, or 3 of the Sherman Act. 1914 Hearings
1849, 1852. As finally reported, however, the bill authorized such suits for
violations of any of the antitrust laws. H.R. RFp. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1914).
22. See note 3 supra.
23. See Blake, The Shareholders' Role in Antitrust Enforcement, 110
U. PA. L. REv. 143, 144 (1961).
24. See Gomberg v. Midvale Co., 157 F. Supp. 132 (ED. Pa. 1955); of.
Fanchon & Marco v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953).
Contra Ramsburg v. American Inv. Co., 231 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1950).




In a broader context, however, a distinction should be drawn
between the plaintiffs such as those in the instant case and sell-
ers competing in the same market. Competitors of the acquired
corporation could conceivably be injured by reason of a merger
which violates section 7. For example, suppose Clorox and Proc-
ter & Gamble proposed to merge. If such a merger is given wide
publicity and wholesalers and retailers believe that the net result
will be to give Clorox the dominant position in the bleach market,
they might increase their Clorox purchases in order to establish
themselves as "good" customers of Clorox before it gains the
dominant position in the market,-7 thereby placing themselves
in a better position to reap available benefits from a solid cus-
tomer relationship at the time that Clorox becomes the leading
bleach manufacturer. Although other bleach manufacturers' bur-
den of proving injury by reason of this proposed merger is great,
due to the difficulty of proving a causal relationship between the
violation and the injury, if the merger is prevented by a section
7 government suit, there appears to be little justification for not
allowing these other manufacturers into court. They could con-
ceivably prove such injury and that possibility should be suffi-
cient to allow them to rely on the section 7 violation, thereby
giving them the opportunity to prove the relationship between
the injury and the violation. To require plaintiffs to show more
than a section 7 violation in order to establish a causal relation-
ship between an antitrust violation and their injury, as was sug-
gested by the court in the instant case, undermines the effective-
ness of private suits as a deterrent to antitrust violations.
27. In order to remain dominant, manufacturers realize the necessity for
maintaining good customer relationships.
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